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Departing the 308th Headquarters, Volckmann boarded an L-5 liaison plane to fly him back to GHQ. 295 Although he was leaving the safety of American lines, he took great satisfaction in knowing that the campaign to retake North Luzon was about to begin.

  CHAPTER 9

  Combat Operations

  Combat operations of USAFIP-NL fell into three distinct phases. The first phase lasted from the middle of 1943—the date of Volckmann’s “Reorganization Plan”—until the arrival of the U.S. Sixth Army at Lingayen Gulf on 3 January 1945. The next two phases overlapped one another: the second phase, from 3 January to 15 August 1945, saw the regiments of USAFIP-NL fight within their respective districts in open combat against the Japanese. The third and final phase of operations lasted from about 1 June until Yamashita’s surrender on 1 September 1945. In this phase, three regiments of USAFIP-NL—the 121st, 15th, and 66th Infantry—fought together as a Division-sized element under the U.S. Sixth Army. 296

  The first phase of combat operations covered the longest period. As mentioned previously, as of 1943–44, Volckmann knew that neither he nor his guerrillas possessed the resources to engage the Japanese in open combat. As a result, Volckmann divided his early operations into two categories: intelligence gathering and subversive activities, both of which took place simultaneously. 297 As he made plans to contact MacArthur and arrange for resupply, Volckmann directed his men to engage in a number of guerrilla activities. These included sabotage, demolition, and small raids on Japanese garrisons. The objective, as Volckmann saw it, was to put the occupying Fourteenth Army on the defensive and erode the Japanese combat power before the Americans arrived to retake North Luzon.

  Volckmann’s decision was important for two reasons. First, a united guerrilla front would draw Yamashita’s priorities away from the North Luzon coastal defenses and, consequently, from any incoming Allied naval task force. Second, Volckmann’s operations would undercut the means by which the Japanese could repel the Allied invasion. Reviewing his options, Volckmann concluded that the Japanese supply system was his priority target. The Japanese had the numerical advantage, but Volckmann apparently knew that he could offset this advantage if he destroyed their means to continue the war. If the Japanese had no ammunition, their rifles would be useless; if they had no fuel or usable trucks, they would lose their mobility; and if they had no food or replacement parts for their equipment, their army would wither and die. Next, Volckmann set his sights on the North Luzon infrastructure. Training the local Igorots and Ilocanos in the art of demolition, Volckmann targeted the road and bridge network over which the Japanese moved their troops. 298 This, however, presented Volckmann with a unique challenge: he had to devise a method of demolition that would impede the Japanese movement without hindering his own or that of U.S. conventional forces once they arrived. During the course of the invasion, the Japanese had put their engineers to work building road and bridge networks to connect their garrisons and improve existing trails, with detours to their supply caches. The solution that Volckmann devised—or so it appears—was to target the Japanese service roads and leave the main highways alone for the time being. Drawing upon conventional military principles, the third leg of Volckmann’s guerrilla strategy included the use of raids and ambushes on Japanese garrisons. 299

  The first phase of combat operations can be told through the messages sent between GHQ and the various district commands. Missions varied in their scope, intensity, and outcome, but they shared the common thread of guerrilla warfare on the rise in North Luzon.

  19 September 1944

  Subject: ENEMY CASUALTIES

  To: 1122 [Volckmann]

  1. For your information, my units had unavoidable engagements with the enemy and had inflicted the following casualties on the enemy’s part.

  A platoon of “B” Co. met Jap patrols (50) in Aludaed, San Juan, La Union and engaged them. 4 Japs killed and no casualty on our part. September 5, 1944.

  On September 10, 1944, “A” Co. wrecked a train with 60 Japs killed and wounded.

  On September 11, 1944, a platoon of “D” Co, while having its daily training, met Japs (20). 7 Japs killed and no casualty on our part.

  On September 12, 1944, the Japs tried to chase the “D” Co…36 Japs killed and 8 wounded. Captured from the enemy 1 Garand rifle, 6 Enfield rifles, and 85 rounds 30 Cal. 2 killed and 6 slightly wounded on our part.

  —2-121-113 300 [Major Diego Sipin, CO, 2nd Battalion, 121st Infantry]

  9 October 1944

  Subject: Mission

  To: 1-66-113 [Parker Calvert, First District, USAFIP-NL]

  1. This is to inform that the mission to ambush Japs patrol at KP [Kilometer Post] 68 & KP 69 was very successful. The officers and EM [enlisted men] fought like fools and devils. In spite of the fact that we did not have BARS [Browning Automatic Rifles], we have given the heaviest blow to the enemy with less than 20 rifles. The enemy were caught [so] unprepared that the Japs were not given a second to fire with the machine gun and rifles. The Japs did not fire a single ammunition. They dropped from the trucks like drunken men.

  2. The following listed hereunder were captured from the enemy:

  One (1) machine gun, US aircool, cal.30

  Four (4) machine gun belts filled with cal.30 ammunition

  One (1) machine gun box

  Six (6) Jap rifles (long)

  Five (5) Jap bayonet

  Twenty (20) Jap helmet

  Four (4) Japs garrison belts

  Many hundreds of cal.30 ammunition

  Many hundreds of Japs ammunition

  3. Detailed report will be submitted later including report of the other group posted at KP 60.

  4. We are proceeding slowly toward home because of heavy load.

  (Sgd) (3-1113-L-1120) 301

  [unidentified guerrilla call-sign]

  In another report dated 17 November 1944, men of L Company, 3rd Battalion, 66th Infantry (First District) set out on a mission to cut telephone wires and to ambush a Japanese patrol. The men of L Company succeeded in disabling the wires, but their ambush turned sour when the patrol called in reinforcements from a nearby garrison. Outgunned and overmatched, the guerrillas fled. Although the enemy patrol had won the day, USAFIP-NL claimed the lives of six Japanese soldiers and eight kilometers worth of telephone wire.

  Other encounters, however, were not so successful. In a report from the Third District, a planned raid on the town of Bangui, a proJapanese town and hotbed of enemy spies, ended in disaster. At 2:30 a.m. on the morning of 29 October, a platoon from the 15th Infantry attacked the town to seize three of its most wanted spies: the mayor, the city treasurer, and a police sergeant. The residents, in a fit of panic, stormed the Japanese garrison for protection. But amidst the darkness and chaos of the predawn debacle, the Japanese opened fire on the townspeople, mistaking them to be guerrillas. In all, 300 civilians died. Hand-to-hand combat ensued as the enemy garrison fought the 15th Infantry until daybreak, when two Japanese fighter planes were called in to strafe the area. USAFIP-NL suffered no casualties that day and even apprehended their target spies, but what had begun as a simple “snatch-and-grab” mission resulted in a destroyed town and over 300 dead civilians.

  Volckmann had no doubts that his men could wear down the Japanese, but to have the kind of catastrophic impact that he desired, he would need a lot more resources and much more time. His operations frustrated Yamashita to no end, but even with the resupply from SWPA submarines, Volckmann could not possibly destroy every bridge, ambush every column, or raid every garrison. To destroy the Japanese completely meant that MacArthur had to fulfill the “I Shall Return” promise.

  As USAFIP-NL peeled away at Yamashita’s combat power, the worried “Tiger of Malaya” began to re-evaluate his predicament. As the Allies advanced on all fronts throughout the Pacific, the Rising Sun diverted more of its combat assets away from the Philippines. This left Yamashita with few options for resupply and fewer options for additional manpower. To correct these deficiencie
s, Yamashita thought it best to use the terrain to his advantage. He was still relatively unaccustomed to the mountainous jungles, but he obviously saw the utility in what they could provide for his defenses.

  Volckmann, meanwhile, kept a close watch on the Allied progress— not just over the radiograms from SWPA, but from the radio station KGEI in San Francisco. 302 News of the Allied landings in the Marshall Islands, New Britain, and the Marianas all meant one thing: U.S. forces were tightening their grip on the Empire of Japan. Yamashita, undoubtedly aware of the same news, began to mobilize his forces inward.

  Yamashita most likely estimated that the Allies would be at his front door by early to mid-1945. Increasingly frustrated by his inability to find and destroy Volckmann, he finally realized that he did not possess the resources to maintain his current defense scheme of Luzon while simultaneously chasing the elusive guerrillas. To do so would have been martial suicide. USAFIP-NL operations had already begun to weaken his combat readiness, and Yamashita knew that more punitive expeditions would only erode more of his resources in the long run. If he continued his wild goose chase against Volckmann, while Volckmann kept coordinating strikes on his troops, Yamashita’s forces would become little more than a Coxey’s army. Consequently, when the Allies finally returned to Luzon, he would have virtually nothing left with which to defend the island.

  Yamashita’s new defense scheme reflected a simple idea: if he could not find Volckmann, he would get Volckmann and the Allies to come to him. Yamashita thus withdrew nearly 150,000 troops into the Cordillera Central of North Luzon. By digging into the mountains, he placed his men into fortified defensive positions with orders to stay put. 303 From a tactical standpoint, it was an ideal defense: if USAFIPNL wanted a fight, they would have to dig the enemy out inch by inch. Essentially, this plan let Yamashita kill the proverbial “two birds with one stone.” He had created a new defensive position that would deter both guerrillas and U.S. conventional forces from digging his troops out, or so he thought. The rugged landscape negated the use of everything that gave American forces their superiority—most notably tanks and mechanized infantry. Yamashita could now command the initiative. However, there were four things that he had not counted on: (1) Volckmann accepting the challenge, (2) Volckmann maintaining regular contact with MacArthur, (3) the submarine resupply system and, (4) that the new defense scheme put his headquarters right in the middle of Volckmann’s largest operational area.

  Forcing Yamashita out of the mountains could be done but not without enormous casualties and loss of life. Volckmann’s native guerrillas knew every square inch of the terrain, but the incoming Allies had no such luxury. With no probable means of aerial reconnaissance available, the Allied cause would have to rely on Volckmann to provide intelligence on Japanese positions and the surrounding terrain. Without it, U.S. conventional forces would be walking into a bloody stalemate as they tried to pry the Fourteenth Army from their mountainous redoubts.

  From 9 January until 15 August 1945, Volckmann directed each of the USAFIP-NL regiments to fight within their respective districts, each obtaining strategic goals that collectively led to the defeat of Yamashita’s forces in Luzon. Meeting with General Kruger, Volckmann outlined the situation in Luzon and the requirements needed to defeat the Japanese. 304 Aside from the obvious necessity for more arms and ammunition, Volckmann would need his forces supplemented by conventional infantry and air units. The first utilization of Sixth Army assets in this regard began with an attack on the southern end of the Yamashita perimeter. 305

  Lepanto-Mankayan Operations (66th Infantry)

  The Sixth Army landings at Lingayen beach put U.S. forces geographically closest to the 66th Infantry Regiment. As the U.S. I Corps began to attack the enemy’s southern flank—thereby diverting Yamashita’s attention—Volckmann sprang into action. With a fresh contingent of rifles, machine guns, bullets, and artillery pieces—courtesy of the Sixth Army—Volckmann began the planning phase for the 66th Infantry’s assault against the enemy enclaves in the area surrounding the Highway 11 road juncture. 306

  The Japanese had built a triangular defense bounded by Bontoc, Cervantes, and the Loo Valley—with Highway 11’s Kilometer Post 90 being the southernmost apex. This area was collectively known as the Lepanto-Mankayan region, so named for the two prominent mountain ridges that dominated the area.

  Lepanto-Mankayan represented one of the most strategically important regions in North Luzon, and as such the Japanese defended it for four reasons: (1) it was the gateway into the Loo Valley, known as the “Japanese breadbasket”; (2) in addition to the rich deposits of manganese and iron, the area was home to Luzon’s largest network of gold and silver mines; (3) Lepanto-Mankayan housed the largest cache of Yamashita’s reserve weaponry; and (4) as indicated in the 66th Infantry’s combat reports, Lepanto-Mankayan guarded the approaches into Ifugao, where the enemy had determined to make their last stand. 307

  In 1941, only a small, unimproved road connected the town of Cervantes to the Lepanto-Mankayan pass. When the Japanese invaded, they converted the trail into a hard-surface road to transport copper from the Lepanto mines. Of late, this road had become the primary defensive line on the Japanese position and, consequently, it became a priority target for the USAFIP-NL. Going up against Volckmann’s guerrillas were the elements of the 19th Tora Division and the 58th Independent Brigade. 308

  The planning phase for the Lepanto-Mankayan assault began with Field Order #27, issued by Volckmann himself. The order called for the assault to be conducted in three phases: (1) the initial artillery preparation and demolition, (2) the ground assault, and (3) consolidation around the Japanese perimeter.

  The assault began with coordinated artillery fire on key enemy positions. Because Volckmann knew that the 19th Division and the other units guarding Lepanto-Mankayan were motorized, he anticipated that they would mobilize their troops via the road and bridge network to defend the precious mines. This realization is where the demolition aspect came into play: as artillery fell on the Japanese, Igorot demolitionists would simultaneously blast the thoroughfares, rendering them impassable. This action, in turn, would isolate the Japanese elements and prevent them from reinforcing one another. 309As the main body of the 66th closed in on the enemy, rear guards would stay behind and occupy the same area that had once been the Japanese perimeter. With guerrillas now occupying the perimeter, American conventional forces could move in to secure the mines.

  When the ground assault began, elements of the 15th Infantry occupied the area surrounding Cervantes, the westernmost apex of the Lepanto-Mankayan defense. This allowed the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry the freedom to move southeast toward Lepanto proper while 2nd secured the communication and supply routes south of Highway 4. The 3rd Battalion, meanwhile, occupied their hastily constructed redoubts in the area surrounding Mt. Namandaraan. This arrangement guaranteed enclosure of the Japanese; escape would not be easy. Of course, “escape” was not what the Japanese had in mind.

  As 2nd Battalion soon discovered, the Japanese were prepared to fight to the death. Several assaults launched by 2nd Battalion to destroy the garrisons immediately north of KP 90 were repelled. One such garrison, about 500 yards southwest of the Mankayan Ridge, successfully repelled nine consecutive guerrilla assaults! Aggravated, the CO of 66th called for air support. In the course of their nine disastrous attempts to unseat the Japanese garrison, 66th Infantry scouts determined that there was a nearby field gun giving fire support from a hilltop only a few hundred yards from the enemy outpost. While Allied planes and guerrilla artillery strafed the hilltop gun site, 1st Battalion moved in to catch the enemy garrison off guard. After the gun was silenced, 1st Battalion launched “a perfectly timed assault, closely supported by 60 mm mortars and knocked out the Japanese stronghold.” 310

  With this latest garrison destroyed, the entire left flank of the Japanese defenses collapsed. A few raids and skirmishes, involving small arms and light mortars, continued sporadically as the 66t
h Infantry pushed eastward through Lepanto proper to the Bontoc side of the Japanese defenses. Finally, on 20 July 1945, the last of the enemyguarded mines fell to the 66th Infantry, bringing the siege of LepantoMankayan to a close. 311

  The 66th Infantry’s destruction of the Lepanto-Mankayan defense was important for several reasons. The Japanese had taken three years to build this compound and made it one of the most fortified positions in North Luzon. Now that the area had fallen to the guerrillas, it effectively siphoned off the largest mineral reserve in North Luzon. Consequently, Yamashita could no longer secure shipments of the precious metals to his Emperor. Also, the Lepanto-Mankayan weapon caches had been wrested from Japanese control. The U.S. military considered it bad form to use captured enemy weapons, but Volckmann and his guerrillas had no concern for such formalities. The smorgasbord of grenades, automatic rifles, and bayonets were fair game. And each battalion of the 66th Infantry enjoyed the fruits of the captured Japanese arsenal.

  San Fernando-Bacsil Operations (121st Infantry)

  Farther north of the Allied landings, in the area surrounding the villages of San Fernando and Bacsil along the coast of La Union, the 121st Infantry directed their attention toward the 6,000 Japanese troops led by Colonel Hayashi. This hodgepodge force was a conglomeration of Marines and four combat regiments taken from the 19th Division. 312

  The Japanese 19th Division had landed at San Fernando earlier in the war. Now, in anticipation of the American landings, the Division had withdrawn the bulk of its forces to Baguio, leaving Hayashi only a few elements with which to defend his coastal areas. Unfortunately for Hayashi, the naval bombardment that screened the Allied landings on Lingayen Gulf had rendered most of the Japanese forces at Bacsil and San Fernando impotent. Consolidating what little equipment they had left, the Japanese contingent built their redoubts into a system of terraces so steep that USAFIP-NL would have found itself literally climbing to meet the enemy. 313