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  At the start of the Korean War, the U.S. Army had no command apparatus for special operations. In fact, the term “special operations” had yet to gain widespread acceptance throughout the military. In response to North Korean partisans, the Army simply created a series of units geared for counterguerrilla or “behind-the-lines” activities. Most of these units fell under jurisdiction of the Eighth Army G-3 Miscellaneous Group, although the Far East Command did retain its own, organic special operations unit. 390

  When Volckmann arrived in Tokyo to report to Eighth Army Headquarters, he met with Colonel John H. McGee,* the hastily appointed Director of Special Operations for the Eighth Army. 391 Weighing in with his assessment of the situation, Volckmann emphasized the need for small-unit tactics and mobility. The elusive nature of the guerrillas would be consistent regardless of what country or ideology to which they swore their allegiance. North Koreans, however, would be especially problematic. They were united not only by a common ideology—in this case, Communism—but an ideology that was now shared by two of America’s newest enemies: the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. The ideological link could spell disaster if it translated into material support. Volckmann also knew that the biggest concern—outside of destroying the guerrilla’s combat capabilities—was to keep them away from civilians. Considering that NPKA had a better grasp on Korean culture and language, enemy partisans would undoubtedly have the upperhand in turning the population against Americans. In the early days of the conflict, when America appeared to be on the losing end of the war, a fear of the South Koreans’ receptiveness to Communist ideology was not completely without merit. A priority for all special operations, therefore, lay in building a rapport with the local civilians.

  * McGee had also been a guerrilla in the Philippines, serving under the command of Wendell Fertig on the island of Mindanao.

  **The U.S. Far East Command was the next highest echelon above the Eighth Army.

  While still assigned to Eighth Army Headquarters, MacArthur appointed Volckmann the Executive Officer of the Special Activities Group (SAG)–Far East Command.** SAG was an interesting conglomeration of U.S. Army Rangers, Marines, and other South Korean personnel commanded by Colonel Louis B. Ely, a veteran of the OSS. As Executive Officer, Volckmann’s responsibility lay in planning and conducting guerrilla activities behind NKPA lines. SAG conducted numerous patrols during the first year of the Korean War, and became especially adept at nighttime operations. “The unit screened refugees, destroyed villages and buildings that could be used by [enemy] guerrillas, and provided medical treatment to civilians. Its effectiveness was enhanced by the provision of radios down to the squad level and the establishment of an extensive intelligence network in conjunction with local authorities and Korean and American intelligence services.” 392 Unfortunately, Far East Command dissolved the Special Activities Group in April 1951, concurrent with the Army’s disestablishment of Ranger companies and all “ranger-style units.” Accordingly, the Army decided “to provide Ranger training to the Army as whole, rather than by relying on special formations.” 393 Still, the Army, in conjunction with the CIA, continued to organize and lead South Korean and disaffected North Korean partisans behind enemy lines. By the end of the war, these guerrillas were collectively known as the United Nations Partisan Infantry in Korea (UNPIK). 394

  In all, Volckmann did not approve of the methods he saw in Korea. During his time with SAG, Volckmann ran into many of the same problems he had encountered with USAFFE nearly a decade earlier: supply issues, unclear mission parameters, and indecisive leadership in the higher echelons. Also, the manner in which the military approached unconventional warfare was largely ad hoc—they had merely thrown together a special operations command for the occasion. Volckmann knew that “reinventing the wheel” with special operations for every war was dangerous and unproductive. What the Army needed was an unconventional force of its own. 395 Although Volckmann had floated the idea as early as 1946, the only progress he made was the Army’s acceptance of FM 31-20 as a guide to train conventional forces to combat guerrillas. Relying on FM 31-20 wasn’t a bad start, but the blunders he witnessed in Korea confirmed his belief in the need for a permanent special operations command.

  The Eighth Army special operations tactics were another point of contention. Statistically speaking, their operations were a success: by the end of 1951, UNPIK had confirmed 9,095 enemy KIA, captured 385 prisoners, captured or destroyed over 800 pieces of enemy equipment, and claimed the destruction of 49 bridges and 22 railroads. 396 But Volckmann had noticed that UN partisan assets were not being used properly. Over half of their engagements had been in open combat against enemy forces. Conversely, only eleven percent of their activity had been dedicated to sabotage, and less than three percent directed against enemy lines of communication along the eastern coast. As Colonel Rod Paschall poignantly remarked, “the partisans had devoted most of their energy and efforts into killing the troops of an enemy that had an almost inexhaustible supply of manpower.” 397 Meanwhile, the task of cultivating civilian support was left to conventional assets and third-party civil agencies, for example the UN Civil Assistance Command. While it was commendable on behalf of the guerrillas to engage the enemy in open combat, it was not the operational context to which they were best suited. According to Volckmann, guerrillas were best geared towards subversive activities (counterintelligence, sabotage, etc.) and were optimized for open combat only when directly supported by conventional forces. Certainly, UNPIK had done a fine job in meeting the latter requirement, but they had paid too little attention to the subversive activities needed to wear down the enemy’s supply and logistical apparatus.

  There were several reasons why the Eighth Army employed the guerrillas in this manner. First, guerrilla operations were kept as a “staff activity.” The Eighth Army kept partisan operations under the supervision of its G-3 Miscellaneous Group. “Since the G-3 could only recommend and not command, there was actually no chain of command for partisan operations.” 398 Second, because special operations remained a staff function, Eighth Army Headquarters never devised a coherent plan for the employment of guerrillas. In the early stages of the war, the existing plans executed under Colonel McGee’s leadership were often confounded by the bureaucratic friction between G-3 and the Eighth Army Command Group. Meanwhile, SAG, under the jurisdiction of Far East Command, operated within its own microcosm and often duplicated the efforts of the Eighth Army partisans. Third, guerrilla operations depended heavily on naval transport and seaborne delivery into their areas of operation. This condition not only limited the guerrillas to a “coastal tether,” it put their operations at the mercy of competing naval requirements. 399

  Volckmann also did not agree with the heavy emphasis on Ranger formations. Volckmann had no objections to the Ranger doctrine or their tactics, but in the realm of special operations, Ranger capabilities were only part of the equation. Covert raids, ambushes, rapid deployments, and extractions—revered tenets in the Ranger tradition—were indispensable to the special operations concept. However, the Rangers did not proscribe the training necessary to accomplish the strategic goals of the special forces, for example building rapport with local civilians and working to exploit local sympathies to American ideology.

  Volckmann did not remain in Korea very long. After less than six months into his tour, he sustained a critical injury and was evacuated to Walter Reed Army Hospital.* Though frustrated by his removal from Eighth Army operations, it proved to be another step that would solidify his legacy within the U.S. Army Special Forces. 400

  *The details of his injury are unclear, although the Volckmann family indicates that it was a relapse of a severe stomach ulcer he had acquired in the Philippines.

  CHAPTER 12

  Special Forces

  The overtures to develop a special warfare doctrine began with the dissolution of the OSS in 1946. Despite the success of Allied guerrillas in World War II, there remained a strong tide
of resentment against the establishment of “guerrilla-style” forces. This bureaucratic resistance arose from the conservative-minded military officers who felt that conventional means were sufficient for combating enemy partisans. Furthermore, these conservative military minds appeared to be growing in number. Indeed, by 1947, even the Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed their doubts about the feasibility of “special forces.” With FM 31-20, however, the Army seemed to have reached a solution that satisfied both sides of the special operations debate. The manual outlined methods guaranteed to dismantle guerrilla forces while still using conventional assets and not relying exclusively on special formations.

  The prevailing wisdom dictated that although “the United States should provide itself with the organization and means of supporting foreign resistance movements,” a civilian agency would be sufficient to handle all aspects of the job—including the training, organization, and management of guerrilla units. 401 After all, why should the Army concern itself with the “unconventional” aspects of warfare when the Army’s designated functions were conventional by nature? Thus, in 1947, the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) took control of all “special warfare” operations—a term it included under the umbrella of counterintelligence and espionage activities. Although the CIA never adequately defined the term “special warfare,” the agency adopted the broadest possible interpretation—deciding that their authority rested over the entire planning, organization, and training of indigenous guerrillas. 402 Although the actual deployment of these guerrillas would be an Army responsibility, the CIA had effectively made guerrilla warfare a paramilitary—and therefore, ultimately a civilian—responsibility. However, the Korean War and the Army-CIA boondoggle in the special operations field sparked a renewed interest in guerrilla-style units and their tactics.

  In the early days of the Cold War, however, the Army’s only study apparatus for “special operations” existed under the Office of the Chief Psychological Warfare (OCPW). A small office tucked away in the bureaucratic jungles of Washington DC, the OCPW was an autonomous study group that reported directly to the Army Chief of Staff. Psychological warfare as a military discipline, however, was woefully ill defined and OCPW’s tasks, therefore, remained ambiguous. Under orders from General J. Lawton Collins, OCPW began operations in 1950 as an outlet for ideas on the development of “psy-war” contingencies. 403 As of yet, however, they had not developed an apparatus capable of delivering psychological operations to any potential enemy.

  Upon his return to the United States, Volckmann completed his next intellectual achievement, FM 31-21 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare. Published in 1951, the manual sought to fill the doctrinal gap left by the demise of the OSS. Recommending that “wartime control of guerrilla warfare be exercised by the theater or unified commands,” 31-21 called for a Theater Special Forces Commander with “an appropriate size headquarters on the same level as the unified command’s Army, Navy, and Air Forces.” 404 In total, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare “was a badly needed, authoritative publication that provided well reasoned methods to organize, control, employ, and disband guerrillas.” These concepts were not lost on the Army as control of partisan forces passed from the Eighth Army to the Far East Command before the end of the Korean War. 405

  *A subordinate command of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.

  FM 31-21 particularly resonated with Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the director of OCPW. McClure himself had an interesting military career. In 1944–45, he had been the head of the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Branch in Europe* and worked closely with the OSS. As the forerunner to the CIA, the OSS’ most memorable accomplishment in Europe was Operation Jedburgh. The participants—or “Jedburghs” as they were known—operated in three-man teams. Delivered by parachute, they would establish contact with local French, Belgian, and Dutch resistance fighters and provide a link to Allied materiel. McClure’s position as the chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch gave him a front row seat to the planning and operations of the Jedburgh campaign. 406

  Influenced by Volckmann’s writing, and recalling the success of the Jedburghs in Europe, McClure sought to create a permanent special operations force that would combine the facets of unconventional and psychological warfare. Seeking Volckmann’s help, McClure approached him with an offer to become OCPW’s Chief of Plans—Special OperationsDivision. Like Volckmann, McClure believed that reinventing a special operations command for every war was counterproductive. Volckmann agreed to join McClure only after being assured that the Army was serious about creating and maintaining a special operations force. Joining Volckmann a few months later was Colonel Aaron Bank, a former OSS operative who had served with the Jedburghs in Europe.* With Volckmann as Chief of Plans, OCPW prepared the framework for what would become the Army Special Forces. 407

  OCPW had the option of outlining a force that could follow one of two organizational precedents: (1) the model provided by USAFIP-NL (developing and organizing guerrillas in enemy territory), or (2) the Ranger-style traditions of a “shock-troop” force. Given the nature of what the Special Forces were intended to accomplish, the USAFIP-NL model provided the most logical basis. Aaron Bank later disclosed that Special Forces “have no connection with ranger-type organizations since their mission and operations are far more complex, time consuming, require much deeper penetration [into enemy territory] and initially are often of a strategic nature.” 408

  Aware of Volckmann’s earlier work, and recognizing the need for a special operations capability, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins held a conference at the Fort Benning Infantry Center in April 1951. In doing so, he opened the floor to discussion on the Special Forces concept. Collins, an infantryman himself, favored the Ranger model. In fact, he was quoted saying that, “the Infantry School should consider the Rangers as well as other troops and indigenous personnel to initiate subversive activities. I personally established the Rangers with the thought that they might serve as the nucleus of expansion in this direction.” 409 In response, Volckmann—who represented OCPW at the conference—authored a memorandum for the Infantry Center commenting on the Chief of Staff’s position.

  * Other members of the OCPW staff included Wendell Fertig, former leader of the Mindanao guerrillas, and Colonel Melvin Blair, a veteran of “Merrill’s Marauders.”

  Volckmann equated the general’s use of the phrase “subversive activities” with “special forces operations.” He then identified six critical elements of Special Forces operations:

  1. The organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare.

  2. Sabotage.

  3. Evasion.

  4. Long-range reconnaissance.

  5. Ranger-style raids.

  6. Psychological Warfare. 410

  Even though the Special Forces would be capable of performing raids and ambushes in the Ranger tradition, their overall mission would be of a different and far more complex nature.

  In regard to the general’s comments on indigenous personnel, Volckmann had this to offer:

  We may visualize the world today as being divided into two major groups or layers of individuals that cover the earth unrestricted by national boundaries. These layers, a red and a blue, are held together by common ideologies. Any future war may well be regarded as an international civil war waged by these opposing layers. The full exploitation of our sympathetic blue layer within the enemy’s sphere of influence is basically the mission of special forces [sic] operations. It is from the blue layer within the enemy’s sphere that we must foster resistance movements, organize guerrilla or indigenous forces on a military basis, conduct sabotage and subversion, effect evasion and escape. We should, through special forces [sic] operations, exploit this layer to assist our ranger and commando operations, and a media for psychological warfare (emphasis added). 411

  Although Volckmann’s use of the term “international civil war” may have been extreme, his discussion of
the “sympathetic blue layer” was not. Volckmann’s conception of Army Special Forces centered on the exploitation of “blue layer” elements, or friendly civilians who could be trained as partisans who could offset the enemy’s “home field” advantage. Volckmann’s memorandum is important because it spelled out the operational framework for the Special Forces, including its purpose—exploitation of the “blue layer”—and its mission parameters (the six critical elements listed above).

  Aside from outlining the operational tenets and roles of the Special Forces, this document is important because it addressed the issue of CIA involvement. Volckmann had written earlier:

  To me, it is basically sound that the military (the Army, since this field falls within ground operations) has the inherent responsibility in peace to prepare and plan for the conduct of special forces [sic] operations and in time of war to organize and conduct special forces [sic] operations. Further, I feel that it is unsound, dangerous, and unworkable to delegate these responsibilities to a civil agency (emphasis added). 412

  Whether Volckmann disliked or distrusted the CIA is unclear, but he obviously knew that they were ill equipped to handle the tasks that were better left to professional soldiers. The Army-CIA alliance in Korea had caused much overlap of responsibility and bureaucratic friction. Furthermore, CIA involvement left military commanders without full control over operations within their sectors.